Background: The Complaint and the Charge Sheet
Between 25 January and 5 October 2021, the de-facto complainant (P.W.1) alleged that she was followed and harassed across Twitter and Instagram by the accused. The prosecution case was that the accused gained unauthorised access to her Twitter account, uploaded her photographs, sent indecent messages from a set of his own Twitter handles, publicly proposed marriage to her in abusive and inappropriate language, and then deleted those accounts from his mobile phone and laptop — thereby destroying the evidence.
The Central CEN Police Station, Bengaluru, registered the case. After investigation, the Inspector filed a charge sheet on 24 October 2022 for offences punishable under sec 66C and 67 of the Information Technology Act and sec 354D and 201 of the IPC. The accused was released on bail at the crime stage, pleaded not guilty, and claimed trial.
Prosecution Evidence: Ten Witnesses, Twenty-Two Exhibits
The prosecution examined ten witnesses (P.W.1–P.W.10) and marked twenty-two exhibits (Ex.P1–P22), together with two material objects — a mobile phone (M.O.1) and a laptop (M.O.2). The accused stepped into the witness box in his own defence as D.W.1 and produced two printouts (Ex.D1 & Ex.D2) on confrontation. The forensic and investigative witnesses, on their own evidence, dismantled the prosecution case from within.
| P.W. | Role | What their evidence established |
|---|---|---|
| P.W.1 | De-facto complainant | Admitted the printouts were taken from a computer in the police station, and that those particulars were not in the sec 65-B certificate; conceded another person could have used the accused's photo. |
| P.W.2 | Panch witness — seizure | Did not know the hash value of the data; stated the wrong panchanama timings; was unsure of the date. |
| P.W.3 | Panch witness — mirror imaging | Professed ignorance of the serial numbers of M.O.1 and M.O.2; contradicted the date of attendance. |
| P.W.4 | Examiner — laptop | Found no Twitter account in the laptop sent for examination; admitted the hash value was never sent to him, and that without it manipulation was entirely possible. |
| P.W.5 | Registered the FIR | Admitted that no sec 65-B certificate was produced at the time the complaint was lodged. |
| P.W.6 | Carried articles to FSL | Admitted the seized articles travelled in a closed box — not a Faraday bag. |
| P.W.7 | Requisitions to Twitter / Facebook | Admitted that, beyond sending request letters, he did no investigation in the case. |
| P.W.8 | FSL analyst | Conducted forensic acquisition and found the MD5 hash of the output files; confirmed no Twitter account in the mobile and no user account on the SIM. |
| P.W.9 | Investigating Officer | Admitted the certificate carried no detail of the system used; that hash values of the mobile and laptop were never generated; and that the additional handles were absent from the complaint. |
| P.W.10 | Formal witness | Submitted the FSL report; did no other investigation. |
Where the Prosecution Collapsed
The case turned on electronic evidence — Twitter-message printouts (Ex.P2) and the data on the seized devices. Both failed the basic tests of admissibility and integrity. The investigating officer admitted in cross-examination that no hash value was generated for the contents of the mobile (M.O.1) or the laptop (M.O.2), and that no hash was ever transmitted to the FSL. The examiner confirmed that, absent the hash value, there was every possibility of manipulation of the data.
The seized devices were carried to the laboratory in an ordinary closed box rather than a Faraday bag, leaving them open to alteration. The forensic examination of both the laptop and the mobile turned up no Twitter account at all. And the complaint (Ex.P1) named only a single handle, while the additional handles surfaced only in the printouts (Ex.P2) — never tied back to the accused through any traceable, certified record.
Since Ex.P4 has not complied the essential ingredients of the Sec.65-B of Indian Evidence Act, the said printouts i.e., Ex.P2 is not admissible in evidence.— Judgment dated 30-4-2026, XLV Addl. CJM, Bengaluru (para 34)
Key Findings of the Court
sec 66C not attracted — no other person's identity used
Identity theft under sec 66C requires the fraudulent use of another person's password or unique identification feature. The accused messaged from his own accounts. The prosecution never showed he used anyone else's identity — and a person using his own identity cannot commit the offence.
sec 67 — content was not obscene or lascivious
An acrostic poem formed from the complainant's name, a crossed-fingers symbol and a public marriage proposal are not lascivious material within sec 67. The IO himself admitted no obscene content was found — only "harassing" material. An unwelcome proposal is not obscenity; if defamatory, the remedy lies elsewhere.
sec 354D — "constantly following" not established
Stalking under sec 354D requires constantly following a woman. Here there was only an exchange of messages, and the prosecution did not produce the full conversation or the complainant's replies. The statutory ingredient was simply not made out on the evidence.
sec 201 — no evidence of screening or destruction
There was no material to show the accused destroyed or screened anything used in the commission of an offence. The charge of causing disappearance of evidence failed for want of proof.
sec 65-B certificate fatally defective — Ex.P2 inadmissible
Ex.P4, the sec 65-B certificate for the Twitter printouts, did not identify the make, model or specification of the computer and printer used to create the secondary evidence. Following Arjun Panditrao Khotkar and Chandrabhan Sudam Sanap, the court held the certificate non-compliant and the printouts inadmissible.
No hash value — manipulation could not be ruled out
The IO never generated a hash value for the contents of M.O.1 and M.O.2 and never sent any hash to the FSL. The examiner confirmed that, without it, the data could have been manipulated. The integrity of the digital evidence could not be vouched for.
Chain of custody broke — no Faraday isolation
The seized devices were transported to the FSL in a closed box, not a Faraday bag, leaving them exposed to remote access or alteration. Read with the absent hash value and the panchanama discrepancies, the custody chain could not be relied upon.
Complaint and charge sheet did not match
The complaint (Ex.P1) referred to a single handle; the additional handles appeared only in the printouts (Ex.P2), with no certified, traceable bridge between the two. The evidentiary link the prosecution needed was missing from the record.
Charges Framed & Outcome
Four counts, two statutes
Charged under sec 66C (identity theft) and sec 67 (publishing or transmitting obscene material) of the IT Act, and sec 354D (stalking) and sec 201 (causing disappearance of evidence) of the IPC. He pleaded not guilty, claimed trial, and entered the witness box as D.W.1 in his own defence.
Acquitted — All Charges
Points 1 to 4 answered in the negative. Acting under sec 248(1) Cr.P.C. read with sec 371(1) BNSS, the accused was acquitted of every charge. M.O.1 and M.O.2 were ordered returned to him after the appeal period, and the bail and surety bonds stood cancelled.
Why This Judgment Matters
The certificate must describe the machine
A sec 65-B certificate that omits the make, model and specification of the computer and printer used to produce a printout is no certificate at all. Particularising the device is a condition precedent to admissibility — not a clerical formality to be cured later.
Integrity is fixed in the first hour
Generating and recording a hash value at the point of seizure, and sending it to the FSL, is what lets a court trust that digital evidence was not altered. Its absence is fatal: where the hash is missing, manipulation cannot be excluded — and the evidence cannot be relied upon.
Using your own account is not identity theft
Identity theft requires the dishonest use of another person's credentials. Messaging from one's own handles, however unwelcome, does not attract sec 66C. The charge framing must answer to the statutory ingredients, not to the gravity of the grievance.
Offensive is not the same as obscene
Unwelcome, defamatory or harassing content is not automatically "obscene" or "lascivious" under sec 67. The sexually-explicit character of the material must be established on its own terms; a marriage proposal or an acrostic poem does not cross that threshold.
Legal Team
Adv. Ranganath M.A.
Lead counsel for the accused before the XLV Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru. Adv. Ranganath M.A. secured the acquittal by dismantling the prosecution's electronic evidence — establishing that the sec 65-B certificate (Ex.P4) failed to particularise the computer and printer used to create the printouts, exposing the complete absence of any hash value for the seized mobile and laptop, and demonstrating the break in the chain of custody where the devices were carried to the FSL without Faraday isolation — and by showing that the charged provisions were not made out on their own terms: sec 66C could not apply where the accused used his own accounts, sec 67 where the content was not obscene, and sec 354D where only an exchange of messages was proved.
Conclusion
Like the firm's earlier acquittal in State v. Sanil Pillai, this judgment is a study in investigative discipline as much as in the law of the offence. The court did not record that nothing occurred between the parties — it found that the State had failed to place admissible, integrity-assured electronic evidence before it, and that the provisions charged did not fit the facts proved.
The missing hash value, the defective sec 65-B certificate, the devices carried without a Faraday bag, the handles that appeared in the printouts but not in the complaint — each deficiency compounded until the prosecution could not meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. For investigators and practitioners alike, the lesson is the one this firm returns to again and again: in a cyber prosecution, the case is won or lost not in the allegation but in how the electronic evidence is seized, hashed, certified and carried to court.